When it was discovered last year that a human kidney transplanted into a private patient at the Humana Wellington hospital in London had been sold by a Turkish peasant rather than donated by a kindly relative, nearly everyone was duly scandalised: politicians of all parties; the BMA; the hospital authorities; and the press all unreservedly condemned the sale of human organs for transplant (1) . Protestations of unwittingness on the part of some of those most closely concerned were also duly made, but their credibility was enhanced neither by later reports that this had not been an isolated case, nor by the subsequent revelation that advertisements had appeared in a newspaper seeking people willing to sell a kidney (2) .
Among those scandalised was of course the Government, a junior health minister somewhat naively declaring that the sale of human kidneys was not only 'abhorrent' but also 'undesirable' (3) , and the Prime Minister following suit. Now, there is clearly something peculiarly ironic about free marketeers, passionate advocates of 'enterprise culture', objecting to people making the best use of their assets in such an enterprising way. Indeed, the businessman who wanted to set up organ transplant agencies as an extension of his adoption business, arguing that selling a kidney was an entirely reasonable way of making money (4) , was perhaps genuinely taken aback at the negative response to his proposal, the Government remaining publicly unimpressed by this particular manifestation of Further comparison might help take the argument further. Let us therefore consider, first, prostitution, and second, wage labour. Lest such analogies be thought inappropriate for the wrong reason, however, let me emphasise that the comparison is between a person buying a kidney to fend off sickness, or even to survive; the prostitute's customer who purchases her or his services to fend off say, profound sexual loneliness, or even, perhaps, in order psychologically to survive; and the employer who purchases a person's labour to fend off, say, the trauma ofmaterial equality, or even, perhaps, in order to survive as a capitalist. Now it might be thought that I am not comparing like with like: for the desire to live, unlike lust and greed, is hardly a sin. But that is just what is at issue. Is not the desire to live at just any price hubris of a very special order, almost, one might suppose, a necessary condition of other sins? Part, I suspect, of the outrage, or at least the queasiness, that many people feel about a person's hiring out his/her body for another's sexual gratification seems bound up with the idea ofviolation: after all, it is only to the extent that the payment concerned buys consent (and ofcourse there is a crucial issue here about the very possibility of any such consent being genuine) that using a prostitute differs from rape. Is hiring one's body out significantly different from either selling a pint of one's blood or selling a kidney? Again, one factor that would appear to link it more closely to the former than to the latter is the matter ofphysical loss. Blood is naturally replaced; a kidney not; and although a prostitute's body is at least arguably violated (depending on the view taken of the difference payment might make vts-a-vis consent) no part of it is simply removed. In the absence of other plausible accounts, I would suggest that it is this which allows many people to suppose that selling one's kidney ought to be illegal, but that 'selling one's body' -while perhaps distasteful, outrageous, immoral even -ought to be permitted. This speculation is, I think, somewhat confirmed by reflection on attitudes to people's selling their labour. Again, it is time, energy, often self-respect, and all too frequently a person's health which are in effect sold: and yet few people seem to suppose that there is anything wrong about this. Of course, the effects of wage labour on a person's body must not be too obviously pronounced: hence the Health and Safety at Work Act; hence, too, our tolerating conditions for others which we would not tolerate for ourselves, whether individually (as long as I am not clearing asbestos) or socially (as long as it is Filipinos in the sugar-cane fields or Taiwanese in the factories whose physical well-being is devasted by long hours in appalling conditions). Much more could be said here, of course: but my point is merely to draw attention to attitudes, rather than offer even the beginnings of the critique these matters deserve (6).
All I wish to do here is note that those who find selling one's labour in one way or another laudable, let alone permissible; prostitution perhaps distasteful, or even immoral, but not sufficiently so as to be made illegal; but who nevertheless oppose the legalisation of selling one's blood or kidney must have in mind an unease about explicitly and openly making a commodity of the human body or parts of it. Those, conversely, who have no objection to selling blood but who yet oppose the setting up of organ transplant agencies must presumably be impressed by the distinction between selling a part of one's body that is easily replaceable and a part that is not, and the removal of which constitutes a clear risk. Those in the former category, however, have something to explain about the special place accorded a very crude distinction between blood and a kidney on the one hand, and one's whole body on the other; or between the deliberate violation of one's body, and the accidental or concomitant damaging of it -that is to say, between explicitly intended consequences and merely unavoidable ones. The first option, however, is unavailable: for it is entirely unclear that I am suffering more harm by selling a kidney than, for example, by renting out my body, especially with all the attendant risks ofthe latter. The second option ofcourse turns on the distinction between effects and double-effects, a distinction which John Harris has once and for all exploded (7). If I know that an action will have such and such a consequence, then, whether explicitly intended or not, I am responsible for that consequence in taking the action concerned. It will not do, therefore, to insist that it is enough to 'be satisfied there is no duress. As far as anything else is concerned, I think it is not my brief. I In conclusion, then, I offer merely the barest outline of how such an argument might look. That an opposite view implies accepting the practice of purchasing kidneys for transplant is ofcourse intended as a reductio of such a view. For the moral point is not that no amount of money could possibly compensate for the loss of a kidney as the intended result of a transaction freely entered into, although I might be inclined to question just this caveat; but that the debate is morally skewed by putting it in these terms. It is the kind of action such a purchase constitutes which is at issue, not how much the buyer pays.
This, then, is the sort of argument I suggest is apposite. It is not the slum-dweller struggling way below the poverty line who is to blame for selling his or her blood: if blame is justified, it lies with the person who buys it, thus supporting and helping to entrench an economic and social system where life can be bought at the right price. It is not prostitutes, female or male, who sell their bodies on street corners in prosperous cities because Kafkaesque social 'security' laws leave them little alternative who merit censure, but, if anyone, the people who rent their bodies. It is not waste disposal workers, train drivers or ambulance workers who deserve blame: it is, if anyone, all those who live off their suffering. It is not, then, the Turkish peasant selling a kidney for £2000 who is committing some gross moral indecency: rather it is the recipient who knows that he or she can have whatever their money can buy, together with the latter's supporting cast -the doctors who profit from the deal; the owners of the private hospital concerned; the proponents of a market view of medicine; and finally the ideologues of wealth, themselves often the very people who rush to condemn the sale of kidneys.
The purchase of kidneys for transplant differs from the purchase of blood, renting ofa body, or purchase of another's health, however 'unintentional', only in its symbolising the nature of all these transactions. Perhaps that is why it raises such a furore -just as Shylock might do in bringing home to an audience truths about the society they live in. And perhaps that is why some of those with the greatest political stake in the status quo rush to condemn such transactions, lest their epitomising the delights, as well as the rigours, of free-market medicine becomes too obvious. To the extent that moral censure complements political and economic analysis, it is the customer who is always wrong. Bioethics is seeking major articles, reports, short discussion papers and book reviews on these or any other ethical aspects of the human genome project. These contributions may be from any relevant discipline. In the case of reports and book reviews, it is suggested that potential contributors contact the editors first to ensure that they are not duplicating other work that has already been solicited. Other contributors who are in doubt about whether their topic will be suitable for the issue are also invited to send an outline of their work.
The deadline for submission of papers is January 15, 1991. Correspondence to: Editors, Bioethics,
